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DOS-RESISTANT DISTRIBUTED TIME SYNCHRONIZATION
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Rene Golembewski and Michael Rossberg and Guenter Schaefer
Ilmenau University of Technology, Germany
Telematics and Computer Networks Research Group
ABSTRACT
In order to securely exchange data over the Internet,
more and more organizations utilize virtual private
networks (VPNs) which form potentially large overlay
networks. Recently, approaches for VPN autocon-
ﬁguration have been presented, and while VPNs
usually do not address availability, novel systems
based on peer-to-peer communication can do so.
Nevertheless, there are no satisfying solutions for time
synchronization within VPNs that are designed for
availability against denial-of-service (DoS) attacks,
node failure, and network partitioning. The Network
Time Protocol (NTP) is widely used, but relies on
hierarchical structures, and thus is not suitable for
scenarios with high availability requirements.
Thus, in this article we present a novel, fully dis-
tributed, and fault tolerant time synchronization
approach, that is designed to be transparently inte-
grated in VPN gateways. Combining diffusion-based
round-trip-synchronization with an external and in-
ternal attacker detection, the proposed mechanism is
making a contribution to resilient VPN design.
Index Terms— time synchronization, attacker detec-
tion, availability, security, VPN
1. INTRODUCTION
In order to exchange private information over untrusted
networks, such as the Internet, worldwide operating
organizations depend on VPNs to connect branch of-
ﬁces. Fig. 1 shows a typical scenario with six pri-
vate networks, building a nested VPN. Inside of VPNs
some important security goals are realized inherently
by the deployed VPN protocol, e.g., IPsec. Communi-
cating nodes are authenticated against each other and
the transfer of data is conﬁdential and integrity pro-
tected.
To successfully achieve these security goals within
VPNs, just like for many other processes in modern
communication infrastructures, time synchronicity
is an important basis. The validation of certiﬁcates
and distributed logging of network events are two
examples, where synchronized clocks are required.
A disadvantage especially of large VPNs is the re-
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Fig. 1. VPN topology with nested subnets and dis-
tributed logging hosts
quired conﬁguration and maintenance effort, resulting
in a limited scalability and difﬁculties in supporting
mobile nodes. Hence, several auto-conﬁguration
approaches have been developed over the last decade,
and notably the more recent ones are organized in
a fully distributed way to avoid scalability issues.
Another advantage is the absence of single points of
failure, thus VPNs can now be optimized with respect
to the previously unaddressed availability.
A fully automated approach for a distributed conﬁg-
uration mechanism is desribed in [1]. This approach
proposes that all VPN gateways are communicating via
a ring-based peer-to-peer overlay structure with proac-
tive established shortcut connections to scale well with
the number of nodes.
Yet, from the perspective of availability, it does make
little sense to design only the VPN management algo-
rithms in a distributed fashion, while other important
higher layer functions like time synchronization, name
resolution, or logging are still realized by central
servers within the VPN, e.g., the current de facto
standard for time synchronization – NTP [2] – depends
on a hierarchical server infrastructure. The goal is
to achieve DoS resilient behavior for all provided
services, and therefore also a distributed algorithm for
time synchronization. Moreover, it is possible that
nodes get compromised by an attacker and can be used
afterwards to disturb the synchronization process.
This article analyzes the current state of the art and
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presents a novel distributed approach for secure time
synchronization with DoS resistance properties. Fur-
thermore, we contribute an evaluation of convergence
and attacker resistance via a simulation study.
The rest of the article is organized as follows: section 2
describes the objectives for a distributed time synchro-
nization in VPNs. Related work is discussed in sec-
tion 3, and in section 4 we describe the main system
design and functionality. Section 5 evaluates the mech-
anism with respect to the objectives by analysis and
simulation study. Finally, section 6 concludes and gives
an overview of planned further research.
2. OBJECTIVES
In order to ensure high availability in VPN scenarios,
time synchronization algorithms should meet the
following requirements:
1. Operation in global VPN environments: As time
needs to be adjusted within Internet Protocol (IP)
based VPNs, there is no possibility to perform any-,
broad-, or multicast. Furthermore, there is no access to
link layer information and nested security associations
must be regarded.
2. Internal clock synchronization: As long as all
VPN gateways are synchronized internally, the whole
VPN is in a consistent state. The local clocks should
be synchronized to the second, which is believed to
be sufﬁciently accurate to provide security services,
e.g., to verify the lifetime of a certiﬁcate correctly and
analyze log ﬁles from different nodes based on their
local timestamps.
3. Accordance of internal clocks and external time:
One consequence of a strictly internal synchronization
is the inevitable divergence of internal and external
time values. Normally, all core functions work prop-
erly without having a strict external synchronicity, but
the algorithm must support means to explicitly syn-
chronize to external clock sources, whose timestamps
shall be securely injected at arbitrary VPN nodes.
4. Integrity: Even though, external attackers are
not able to determine the meaning, or undetectably
change any transmitted data, because of the encrypted
VPN tunnels, but it might be possible to drop or delay
packets to gain inﬂuence on time synchronization.
Especially the latter, which will henceforth be referred
to as delay attack, is difﬁcult to detect and must not
be able to successfully manipulate the synchronization
mechanism.
Internal attackers are potentially able to take part in the
synchronization process and try to manipulate other
nodes. The synchronization algorithm shall be robust
to such attacks as long as not more than half of its local
neighborhood is compromised.
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Fig. 2. Partitioned network scenario with lost external
synchronicity in left partition
5. Availability: Even if one or more nodes are unable
to communicate due to a DoS attack, the synchro-
nization of the remaining ones should not be affected.
Furthermore, it shall not be possible to distinguish
nodes with an additional external synchronization from
other participants, in order to prevent directed attacks.
6. Robustness: Closely related to availability is the
resistance against random failures or harsh network
conditions. If no communication between two or
more groups of gateways is possible, e.g., because of
broken links in the transport network (see Fig. 2), the
whole VPN can be partitioned. The most important
requirement is the permanent inner synchronicity of
the subnets after partitioning. Furthermore, if two
former partitioned subnets get united again with a
certain time offset, they should not see each other as
attackers but should instead perform an unexceptional
synchronization.
Additionally, the algorithm should also be robust
against comparably high packet loss in order to deploy
it in scenarios with mobile nodes or bad connectivity.
7. Efﬁciency: Time synchronization needs additional
information exchanges between the neighboring nodes,
and the induced overhead shall be as small as possible.
Moreover, the whole processing of the implemented
features should not generate much load on VPN nodes,
because the processing power may be limited, e.g., on
embedded or mobile devices.
8. Scalability: In order to be deployed in large VPNs
and transport networks like the Internet, synchronicity
must be achieved by communicating only with a
constant or logarithmic number of neighboring nodes.
Furthermore, the use of broad- and multicast is not
possible.
3. RELATED WORK
The following section gives an overview concerning
the state of the art in synchronizing clocks over com-
munication networks. The most important approaches
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are described in more detail and rated according to the
previously introduced objectives.
3.1. Approaches for wired networks
NTP and the Simple Network Time Protocol (SNTP)
[2, 3] are perhaps the most popular protocols for time
synchronization in IP networks. Being a hierarchical
client-server approach, synchronization information
is distributed from an external clock source at the
top over intermediate servers to clients at the lowest
level. Although actually forming a forest, DoS attacks
and compromised nodes may cause serious problems.
Thus, NTP is inappropriate in VPNs with high avail-
ability requirements.
Further approaches for ﬁxed networks are the well
known Berkeley synchronization [4] and the similar
algorithm of Cristian [5]. In both mechanisms time
servers send out the time values to the clients, which
adjust their local clock without any further checks.
These centralized servers are an exposed target for
attacks against the availability, and it is possible to
control all individual times by compromising the
master.
3.2. Time synchronization in wireless sensor
networks (WSNs)
The emergence of WSNs goes along with fundamental
changes in nearly every distributed algorithm [6], and
when comparing VPNs and WSNs similarities in the
failure model emerge. Both require fully distributed
approaches to manage random failures and internal as
well as external attackers.
[7] and [8] summarize the most important algorithms
for time synchronization in WSNs. Current research
focusses on reﬁning the approaches to realize attack re-
sistance and to cope with node breakdowns [9, 10, 11,
12], as well as compensating local clock-drifts [13].
The article [14] proposes a method called Asyn-
chronous Diffusion (AD) for use in WSNs, which is
most applicable to the stated objectives. This algorithm
depends on the asynchronous exchange of timestamps
with all neighbors, which are collected and averaged.
The obtained mean time is then periodically sent out
to the neighbors, which in turn adjust their local clocks
afterwards.
As long as all participants exchange synchronization
information with nonzero probability, the algorithm
was proven to converge. The use of broadcasts and
link layer access makes the algorithm not directly
deployable in VPNs, but the fundamental approach,
i.e., the asynchronous averaging of timestamps, is a
good starting point.
4. SYSTEM DESIGN
This section introduces a hybrid approach for keeping
a common internal time on all gateways of a VPN, as
well as the synchronicity between VPN and environ-
ment. In a ﬁrst step, the internal system clock of a
VPN node will be adapted concerning the drift, be-
fore the actual distributed algorithm performs a syn-
chronization within the VPN. Both steps are covered
in detail in the following.
4.1. Autonomous Drift Adaption
The adjustment of the drift of the local software clock
is most important during the ﬁrst participation in the
synchronization process, and can be repeated later on
if necessary. This can be realized utlizing one of two
sources: Either the joining node trusts the existing
network and starts compensating the drift of its
software clock against the other nodes, or against the
local hardware clock, which is mostly triggered by a
Complementary Metal Oxide Semiconductor (CMOS)
oscillator. Concerning security and reliability, a net-
work with many already synchronized nodes is more
reliable than a hardware clock, which may be rather
heavily inﬂuenced by the local environment of the
node, but in order to retain heavily drifting software
clocks it is still proﬁtable to synchronize against the
local CMOS clock ﬁrst.
Training time
Software clock
Trusted reference clock (CMOS clock or stable network)
Difference
Fig. 3. Drift Adaption Measurement
Drift adaptation is technically realized by a training
time (see Fig. 3), whereas the precision of this pro-
cess increases with longer measurement periods. Af-
terwards, a frequency correction can be computed and
applied to the local software clock.
4.2. Measurement of Round-Trip-Times (RTTs)
After the intial local drift correction, the periodic
neighborhood synchronization starts. The main
principle for exchanging time information is the
asynchronous measurement of RTTs (see Fig. 4).
All communicating nodes are periodically asking
their neighbors for their local time. The queries are
immediately answered including a nonce N from the
request, which ensures the freshness of the answer
and helps to avoid delay attacks of arbitrary length
as nonces will be marked invalid after a short time.
The assumption of a symmetric RTT is made, because
a neighbor is never seen as trustful, concerning it’s
reported local time. Thus, it is also not possible taking
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into account a processing time at the answering node,
which could also be forged. In fact, only the delay of
the answering packet is important, because it is used
to estimate the actual time of the respective neighbor.
Since the algorithm is executed by all nodes of a VPN,
time changes.
TNonce
TNeighbor
Tlocal
RTT
Node A Node B
Time
N
N, T N
eigh
bor RTT
2
Fig. 4. RTT Measuring
To protect nodes against each other, synchronization is
only allowed between direct neighbors or via shortcut
connections, which are realized by the ring-based VPN
overlay (see [1] for details). This is needed to avoid
the excessive creation of new connections and gaining
more inﬂuence on a speciﬁc node, that could enable an
internal attack.
4.3. Averaging Algorithm
As described in section 3, a network can be synchro-
nized by averaging all collected timestamps in each
node and afterwards adjust all nodes’ clocks. Our al-
gorithm differs from the mentioned implementations,
because the calculated mean time is not sent out to the
neighbors to adjust their times. The computed average
neighborhood time is only used to set the own local
clock a step towards this value. A node has therefore
not to trust any neighbor about the new time value it
should accept. Given a number of N neighbors with
different time offsets On, the correction value C can
be calculated as
C =
1
N
N∑
n=1
On . (1)
Additionally, the information of some special gateway
neighbors can be weighted stronger in order to speed
up the synchronization, which is called topology adap-
tation. This situation evolves mainly in nested sce-
narios, where for example a certain amount of nodes
is building an enclave with only one gateway to reach
other nodes indirectly (see Fig. 5). In this case, the net-
work would take a much longer time to converge glob-
ally without a special topology adaptation. Other dis-
tributed synchronization algorithms do not cover this
special case, therefore it is explained in more detail in
the following.
Public
Network
Fig. 5. Five enclaved nodes behind a single VPN gate-
way in a nested scenario
A gateway with many nested nodes behind it can
mostly contribute better synchronization information
from inside of the core network. But because of the
averaging algorithm, it would not have a big inﬂuence
on a strongly connected enclave. The goal is on the
one hand to prefer a gateway’s information, but on
the other hand to empower it not too much, in order
to avoid that it becomes a potential weak point for
attackers. Therefore, all neighbored gateways that
are serving the enclave must not exceed a certain
weight w, which is calculated in every node based
on the number of all neighbors N and the amount of
gateways G:
w =
⌊
N −G
G
⌋
. (2)
The resulting correction value C can now be given as
C =
1
N −G+ wG
(
N−G∑
n=1
On +
G∑
g=1
w ·Og
)
. (3)
All gateways can now have a little more inﬂuence, lim-
ited by the number of other neighbors.
Furthermore, there can also be inaccurate values caused
by different malicious nodes or bad connection param-
eters, that should not be used to calculate the new local
time. The classiﬁcation of nodes in capable or unca-
pable for synchronization is implemented in the follow-
ing algorithm for attacker detection. The basic princi-
ple is to introduce a stability ﬂag to classify each node,
and use only the stable ones for synchronization.
4.4. Attacker Detection
Attacker detection is equivalent to the ability to identify
nodes with corrupt synchronization information. There
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can be various reasons for incorrect information: Pro-
cessing times, queueing of packets, jitter, asymmetric
RTTs or deliberate delaying of packets. Of course, an
internal attacker could also forge the timestamps before
sending them to the other nodes.
The only possibility to separate “good” and “bad”
nodes is the examination of received timestamps. To
have a more detailed view on the behavior of synchro-
nization neighbors, a certain amount of previously
received information is kept for statistical analyses and
can be accessed by the detection algorithms.
The detection of malicious behavior is divided in dif-
ferent phases. To be marked as stable, a neighbor’s
offset must not exceed a hard limit, which is deter-
mined in the conﬁguration ﬁle, or automatically cal-
culated inside each node, based on the average offsets
of all stable neighbors. This value shall prevent the
network from beeing inﬂuenced by new joining nodes
with a strong time difference, and it is also a protection
against internal attacks with huge offsets.
Afterwards, there is a threshold detection and adap-
tation mechanism, which automatically adapts to the
received timestamps of each single synchronization
neighbor, in order to get a ﬁrst outlier detection by
excluding nodes from the averaging algorithm, if they
are exceeding the threshold temporarily (see Alg. 1).
The value Tmax is inherently given by the maximum
allowed offset for all neighbors, and the minimum
threshold Tmin should be in the dimension of the
timestamp’s standard deviation, or can be set to zero.
Algorithm 1: Threshold adaptation
if abs(offset) < threshold2 then1
threshold ← max (threshold × 0.9, Tmin);2
if abs(offset) > threshold then3
excludeNodeTemporarily ← true;4
threshold ← min (threshold × 1.1, Tmax);5
else6
excludeNodeTemporarily ← false;7
Like mentioned before, we are using a stability crite-
rion for each connected synchronization neighbor, and
if more than half of a node’s neighbors are classiﬁed as
stable, it only uses their timestamps for the averaging
algorithm. In the beginning, a joining node will have
a fully unstable neighborhood and accepts all synchro-
nization messages to adapt to the network as quickly
as possible. Also the next steps are integrated in the
detection process and enable the possibility to set the
stability ﬂag of a neighbor.
Subsequent to the offset thresholds, an outlier correc-
tion and drift analysis is done by using linear regres-
sion. This is enabled by saving the last received times-
tamps of all neighbors and the respective local times-
tamps of their arrival in different queues, that build the
underlying dataset for the following operations. Nor-
mally, the compared clock vectors should produce a re-
gression function with a slope of 1.00, if the frequen-
cies of both clocks are about the same (see Alg. 2).
Therefore, we can make a comparison between local
and neighbored clockspeeds, and either mistrust drift-
ing nodes, or make the assumption that the own local
clock needs to be tuned, if all neighbors seem to be
drifting in the same direction.
Algorithm 2: Detection of clockdrift to a single
neighbor with simple linear regression analysis
sumx, sumy, SSxx, SSxy ← 0;1
size ← neighborQueue.size();2
for i ← 0 to size do3
sumx += referenceQueue[i];4
sumy += neighborQueue[i];5
y ← sumy / size;6
x ← sumx / size;7
for i ← 0 to size do8
SSxy += (referenceQueue[i] - x) ×9
(neighborQueue[i] - y);10
SSxx += (referenceQueue[i] - x)2;11
slope ← SSxy / SSxx;12
The third level of stability detection is also based on
a statistical evaluation of the received offsets. Mobile
devices are most likely connected via GSM, UMTS,
WLAN, or Bluetooth. Large and asynchronous RTTs,
more jitter and other special characteristics of the un-
derlying transport networks can have a negative inﬂu-
ence on the synchronization algorithm. On the other
hand, a low standard deviation indicates a stable con-
nection and an excellent counterpart for time synchro-
nization.
After these three steps are processed, a stability deci-
sion can be made in every node, to evaluate and clas-
sify the neighborhood. Participants with bad connec-
tion parameters, who are always scored as unstable by
others, thus have the ability to synchronize their own
local clocks against the network, even if no other node
is taking their information into account.
5. EVALUATION
In this section, we present the results of our simula-
tions and evaluate the introduced mechanisms quali-
tatively. The synchronization algorithm has also been
tested on a Linux-based scenario with 17 different x86
machines, whereas the results reﬂected the outcomes
of the simulation study. The chosen network topol-
ogy was generated by using the Skitter dataset, pub-
lished by the Cooperative Association for Internet Data
Analysis (CAIDA) [15]. Based on this Internet wide
(BGP-)router topology, a reduced scenario with 217
nodes was computed to have a statistically similar ana-
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Fig. 6. Convergence with 204 nodes
lytic model of the Internet backbone. The used simula-
tion framework was OMNeT++ [16] with INET exten-
sion and additionally implemented IPsec support.
5.1. Operation in global VPN environments
Since the algorithm does not make a use of any cross-
layer communication, it is deployable in any kind of
IP network. Features like any-, broad-, or multicast are
also not needed to exchange synchronization messages.
As long as the network is connected, a global mean
time will be reached inside.
5.2. Internal clock synchronization
To measure the synchronization speed, we initially
added an offset to all clocks. Different statistical
distributions of that failure had no inﬂuence on the
synchronization speed. Thus, we have chosen a
uniform distribution, which allows us to make a
statement about the stability of the global mean after
synchronizing. Our metric was the elapsed time
until the difference between lowest and highest clock
reading fell below a deﬁned value, which we set to
500ms for the network to be synchronized.
Figure 6 shows an exemplary process for about 10
minutes after the synchronization algorithm was
started. This scatterplot makes it easy to see the
exponential convergence of the local clock readings
against the global mean.
We also analyzed, if there are any inﬂuences on the
synchronization behavior with special topological char-
acteristics like nested scenarios or clustering of gate-
ways behind one another. With our computed simula-
tion topology we were able to cover all of these special
cases and can state a high ﬂexibility concerning the un-
derlying topology.
5.3. Accordance of internal clocks and external
time
Reaching external synchronicity can be realized by us-
ing one or more trustful external timing sources. To en-
able this behavior, the time adjustment must be turned
off for the externally synchronized node manually, and
it is necessary, that the network is synchronized to the
respective node ﬁrst, because otherwise it could be seen
as an attacker. An administrator can therefore set the
time of all nodes at once, to reach this synchronic-
ity initially. After that procedure, an externally syn-
chronized node can prevent the whole network from a
hardly detectable long-term drift. Of course, this solu-
tion can only work with a compensable clockdrift in all
other nodes, but that is realized by the introduced drift
adaptation method.
5.4. Integrity
As mentioned before, an external attacker is only able
to delay packets in the transport network, without
knowledge if this might be synchronization informa-
tion. That may result in an asymmetric RTT and can
inﬂuence the algorithm to a minor degree. The solution
is to exclude timestamps with a very high RTT value
in general. For example, if we allow a maximum RTT
of one second, and the attacker is able to delay all
incoming packets of a certain node (ISP position),
he can reach a maximum time failure of one second
(minus the real one-way delay). Thus, an external
attacker can only generate a limited bias at a certain
node and is not able to harm the synchronicity. Even if
a node is connected via WLAN or GPRS, the RTT is
always below 2 seconds in the worst case [17].
Internal attackers have the same rights and possibilities
as normal nodes, so they can actively distribute forged
timestamps. Nevertheless, they are not able to eaves-
drop any synchronization messages of other nodes. The
main advantage for internal attackers is the ability to
analyze a neighbor’s reaction on forged timestamps.
That is the reason why we also consider an adaptive
attacker model called frog boiling [18]. The name for
this attack bases on the rumor, that a frog would not
recognize its own threat if he is put into cold water, that
is slowly heated until it boils. Of course this is only a
story, but it describes the attacker model very well. All
other attacks (e.g., false timestamps with big offsets)
are easy to recognize for the introduced attacker de-
tection. At least about half of a nodes neighbors must
be compromised to enable those trivial attacks. A frog
boiling attack is very hard to detect, because the at-
tacker can directly examine his own proﬁt, and thus
adapt the applied strategy. This can only be successful,
if it is not possible for the victim to distinguish good
and bad neighbors.
Obviously, a frog boiling attack needs a lot of time to
be performed, and it is questionable how long it takes
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to notice that a node has been compromised. Even
though, it is possible to enforce a small drift to the
whole network, if no external time sources are avail-
able. The forged timestamps would be diffused through
the entire network, and a clock difference between in-
ternal and external time would occur. This is not pos-
sible, if the network is connected to one or more “hid-
den” clock sources. In this case, a frog boiling attacker
is trying to pull a chosen victim away from the common
mean time.
We simulated this behavior in the former described sce-
nario with 217 nodes, whereas 204 are running the syn-
chronization code, and the remaining 13 nodes are cho-
sen as backbone routers (see Fig. 7). The attackers
are positioned in the network randomly with a certain
pre-deﬁned probability (x-Axis). Therefore, a node de-
termines a random number and then makes a decision
if it becomes an attacker or not. The resulting distri-
bution of local times after an attack of 2 hours with
variable attacker probability is depicted in the given
Figure. By slowly increasing the transmitted times-
tamps, the attackers are about 750ms ahead, compared
to all uncompromised nodes. With more than 5% at-
tacker probability, some nodes start trusting their at-
tackers and drift away from the average network time
by adopting the forged time.
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Fig. 7. Frog boiling attack with different attacker prob-
abilities
Unfortunately, a distributed synchronization algorithm
cannot be fully protected against the frog boiling
attack, as long as small offsets are allowed, because the
attacker can always adapt his behavior to the imposed
restrictions. This raises the question, what we call
a successful attack against the synchronization algo-
rithm. Knowing that frog boiling is not recognizable in
a system of potentially wrong clocks, we can conﬁrm
that the more attackers we have inside a network, the
higher the inﬂuence on the synchronization algorithm.
In fact, an amount of less than 5% had no measureable
inﬂuence on our algorithm, because of the averaging of
all timestamps. Furthermore, an attacker must act as a
trustworthy node all the time and is not able to dictate
other node’s times, as long as he does not control more
than 50% of their neighbors. In our simulation runs,
we positioned the attackers in the network randomly.
Hence, we were not able to exclude this special case
of an overwhelmingly malicious neighborhood in
some cases. This is the reason for some positive frog
boiling attacks starting from 5% attacker probability,
which are completely traceable back to the stability
criteria, we introduced before. In a strongly connected
network, with a high number of neighboring nodes,
attacks would be much more complicated than in
sparsely connected scenarios.
5.5. Availability
Due to the fact, that our algorithm is fully distributed
and localized, there is no vulnerable single point of
failure whose compromise can have a big inﬂuence on
the synchronization. A potential attacker would have to
prevent the whole communication of nodes for a long
time, but then no VPN communication would be possi-
ble at all.
5.6. Robustness
In case of a network partitioning, the divided subnets
proceed with the synchronization just like before, and
the synchronicity is always ensured. If the separation
continues for a long time, the subnets might drift away
from each other because of small differences in the re-
sulting clockdrifts. Due to the stability metric, a later
reunion may lead to a situation with temporarily insta-
ble nodes until the whole network is fully synchronized
again. Mostly, this will be the nodes of the smaller sub-
net, but that depends mainly on special topology prop-
erties and neighborhood relationships.
5.7. Efﬁciency
Synchronization messages are always piggybacked at
communication processes of the VPN overlay. To rea-
lize the freshness of timestamps, a nonce is sent in the
request message and has to be appended to the reply
message, as well as a timestamp of the local clock. The
timestamp is an 8 byte ﬂoat value, and the nonces are 4
byte integer values.
The computing overhead for time synchronization de-
pends linearly on the number of synchronization neigh-
bors, and the steps for attacker detection are constant
due to the ﬁxed size of all data queues.
5.8. Scalability
To ensure a fast and precise synchronization, a node
must not have a huge amount of neighbors. It is more
important to reach the whole network with shortcut
connections and a maximum number of O(log n)
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hops. This is realized by establishing those connec-
tions proactively and thus limit the number of needed
neighbors (see [1] for details). Because of that, the
algorithm scales well with a growing number of nodes.
6. CONCLUSION AND FUTURE WORK
Within this article, a novel approach for distributed
time synchronization in IP networks and large VPNs
was presented. In combination with attacker de-
tection and stability metrics, a topology adaptation
was implemented to be used also in nested and
complex scenarios. Compared to existing distributed
synchronization approaches, e.g., the very similar
asynchronous diffusion, this algorithm exclusively
uses unicast IP communication for the exchange of
messages. Furthermore, nodes do not trust each other,
and do not accept any information without additional
checks. The only reliable source of information is
the measured RTT, whereas the neighbored time
information is always assumed to be potentially
corrupt.
Additionally, the proposed algorithm does not rely
on any initiator and has no central instances, which
could be a primary target for attackers. The use of an
asynchronous and distributed mechanism eliminates
this weak point. A temporary network partitioning is
tolerable and occurs without a loss of inner synchronity
in the several subnets.
To analyze the robustness against external and internal
attackers, a simulation study was conducted and dis-
cussed. External attackers are not able to harm the
synchronization process by delaying packets because
of the maximum RTT values. An adaptive internal at-
tacker is able to manipulate timestamps and can have a
bigger inﬂuence on the algorithm. Nevertheless, he is
not able to really harm the network with only a small
amount (< 5%) of compromised nodes. If an adaptive
attack is implemented in several nodes, the attacker can
stay undetectable and try to inﬂuence the network with
seemingly good values, but several detection mecha-
nisms and thresholds are reducing the achievable dam-
age.
However, some issues remain to be improved in further
studies. A problem that has not been addressed in the
required depth is the fully automatic tuning of all syn-
chronization parameters. Options like maximum RTT,
standard deviation, or stability ratio are set via the con-
ﬁguration ﬁles or with a default value. But with fully
automatic adaptations there should not arise new attack
possibilities with compromised nodes. In all cases it
should be considered how an adaptive attack can ma-
nipulate the implemented procedures.
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